Charlie Weis: Offensive Genius or Overrated Playcaller

After a 3-9 season that saw the Fighting Irish plummet to the bottom of the national rankings in every meaningful offensive category the question on many minds is whether head coach Charlie Weis' reputation as an excellent playcaller and offensive genius is fake or founded.

Weis built a reputation for being one of the most innovative offensive minds in the NFL while working under Bill Belichick in the New England Patriot organization. Not only did he develop an excellent offensive playbook, he was also one of the better playcallers in the NFL due to his meticulous preparation and uncanny ability to adjust his offensive strategy during the game.

To be certain, this was one of the reasons Notre Dame found Weis to be such an attractive hire. After two seasons of what many considered to be an under-performing offense under then head coach Tyrone Willingham and offensive coordinator Bill Diedrick, athletic director Kevin White hired someone to bring life to a woefully ineffective and inefficient Irish offense. With his offensive prowess and NFL pedigree, Weis seemed like a good fit at his alma mater, albeit not many peoples' first choice for the job.

Weis hit the ground running in his first season at Notre Dame taking Brady Quinn from relative unknown to household name. His reputation for excellent quarterback tutelage proved true as Quinn orchestrated the offense to multiple record-breaking performances. Had a few things broken a little differently for the Irish they may have had a shot to play for the 2005 National Championship. But after the 2005 season things seemed to turn for the worse.

The 2006 version of Weis' offense seemed to regress. It struggled against more talented defenses, not being able to protect the passer or gain separation against more physical and athletic secondaries. With virtually the same offensive personnel this was puzzling. While there was a little less depth and some more youth at a few offensive positions the expectations going into the 2006 season were high, leading many to question if defensive coordinators had adjusted to Weis' playcalling and strategy.

A closer look at the defenses the Irish faced in 2005 and 2006 sheds a bit of light in the situation. In 2005 the Irish offense faced no great defenses and only two decent defenses when they played Michigan and Ohio State, scoring only 17 and 20 points respectively. In 2006, however, the Irish faced two decent (Michigan and Georgia Tech) and two very good defenses (USC and LSU). Against these teams they struggled to protect the passer and get receivers open.

Enter the 2007 season when the Fighting Irish offense simply imploded. As discussed here Weis made a bad problem worse by taking an extremely young team and installing a completely new offense. Not only did this move away from the strength of the team-it's under-used running attack-it also confused many young players thrust into first-time starting roles. In particular, the way Weis handled the quarterback situation was suspect, with two of the four quarterbacks vying for playing time subsequently transferring to other schools. The Irish looked incapable of blocking, throwing, and catching for the overwhelming majority of the season. This display of offensive ineptitude led many to question the "offensive genius" handle so oft attached to Weis' name.

One poor season of offensive production does not undo the contribution Weis made to the Irish offense in his first two seasons at Notre Dame, nor many others in the NFL. While the Fighting Irish offensive production in 2006-especially against Michigan, Georgia Tech, USC, and LSU-didn't meet expectations, those expectations would never have been so high if it were for the performance of Brady Quinn et. al. in 2005. In summary, the tougher slate of defensive teams in 2006 and raised expectations from 2005 hurt the perceived performance of the 2006 Irish offense.

But even the most ardent optimist becomes a skeptic after a 3-9 record and few-to-no exciting offensive statistics. This begs the natural question(s): Is Weis' prowess as an offensive designer, playcaller, and developer of quarterback talent over-rated? Have defensive coordinators caught up to his offensive strategy and design, adjusting to better defend against his offense? Or, perhaps more appropriately, does Weis' offense and playcalling strategies translate from the NFL to the college level?

The Weis Offense

The Good

The strength of Weis' offensive playcalling, strategy, and design lies in three primary facets. First, as a playcaller Weis has an extraordinary ability to set up plays. He is frequently one or two plays ahead of opposing defensive coordinators. He waits for the perfect moment to dial up the perfect play, and this value of his playcalling abilities should not be overlooked or underestimated. Weis also adjusts his playcalling during a game as well as any other offensive coordinator. His ability to find something that will work is uncanny.

Second, Weis uses multiple formations and personnel groupings extremely effectively as the foundation of his offensive strategy. He believes in playing to the strengths of his offense and the weaknesses of opposing defenses. This sounds basic, and it is, but it is the way in which he goes about it that is exceptional. Weis uses formations and personnel groupings as well as any coach, generating the best possible matchups for his offense.

His offense creates these matchups by utilizing play and formation groupings that force the opposition to defend multiple plays from the same post-snap motion and different pre-snap formations. It isn't that his offenses run that many plays, per se, it is that he designs his offense to run the same play from multiple looks, i.e. several formations and personnel groupings. This gives his offense extreme breadth and the appearance of great depth while seemingly not increasing its complexity.

Third, Weis is meticulous in his pre-game preparation. On a week-to-week basis he dissects opposing defenses, scavenging for weaknesses and exploiting them. He has an excellent record of scripting plays, scoring on the opening drives of games a remarkable percentage of the time.

The Bad

As good as Weis can be as a playcaller, developing offensive strategy, and preparing for games there are drawbacks to his approach. As a playcaller Weis typically gets too creative when it isn’t necessary. This has often been his critics’ biggest complaint. Rather than stick with something basic and effective, he frequently tries to get cute or complicated. More often than not this backfires when something simple would have been effective. In 2007, for example, there was no reason to run the ball all the way down the field only to call a play action-pass in the red zone in hopes of catching the defense off guard and scoring.

Additionally, Weis' offenses are typically pass-first. While the play calling percentage is frequently near 50/50 run/pass, the run is not used as a "strike-first" weapon. Rather, it is used to complement the passing game and keep opposing defenses honest. Weis focuses mostly on offensive and defensive mismatches in the passing game, and over the majority of his career hasn't employed a power running game. Because his offense is pass-heavy, it needs fairly experienced football players to execute it. Precision in the passing game also requires excellent timing between the quarterback and his receivers, making practice time a commodity.

Finally, Weis’ offense relies heavily on a very high level of quarterback play. The quarterback must not only know his own assignment, he must also know the assignments of every other position. This isn’t uncommon for any offense but due to the complexities of the route adjustments, hot reads, and audibles, the quarterback is tasked with a high level of responsibility.

Fulfilling this level of responsibility requires more than a minimum abount of intelligence and specific physical tools. It requires repetition and practice. It requires the quarterback to be able to read defenses, understand the offensive play call, and then adapt to what the defense does both before and after the snap. And it requires that the quarterback perform these tasks in a very short amount of time.

Memorizing the playbook and being able to make the throws are only the beginning of a quarterback's responsibilities in Weis' offense. The most difficult task is taking the mental part of the game and translating it into the physical. The most difficult part is reacting, rather than thinking and then doing. However, since Weis has a great reputation and proven track record for developing quarterback talent this need of his offense typically isn’t a concern.

The NFL vs. College Game

Football is football. At its heart it is about blocking, running, and tackling. The things that make a good football player are nearly the same at any level. However, at different levels of the game some things are more important than others.

The NFL has parity amongst its rosters. Not only is there depth of talent, the players are far more developed than at the college level. Players are more polished upon entering (and certainly leaving) the NFL than they are in college. They are more physically mature and have a better understanding of offensive and defensive philosophies due to their previous years of playing experience. Because of this, player and talent development is far less important in the NFL than in college. This also makes it far easier to run more complicated offenses and defenses in the NFL as the players’ prior experience enables them to execute at a higher level.

One could even stipulate that success in the NFL is more predicated upon the cerebral aspects of football. NLF rosters are made of experienced, developed, and knowledgeable players. Success is largely driven by mental factors, i.e. how players are able to use their physical abilities in conjunction with the evolving mental challenges of the game.

Obviously there is no replacement for great talent, but it is less valuable in the NFL than in college. College rosters are comprised of raw, talented athletes who may or may not become complete football players. Most outperformed their peers at the high school level via sheer athletic ability rather than football acumen. Thus, in order to become more complete football players, it is important that they develop from good coaching and tutelage.

Additionally, motivating college players is enormously important. Some of the best in the business-Pete Carroll, Mack Brown, Les Miles-are very good motivators. Players are young, impressionable, and not motivated by a salary. There is a sense of team, camaraderie, and loyalty to their universities and teammates. In the NFL there is little to no affinity with the team organizations. Players are motivated more by their paycheck, and not as much by the fans, their teammates, and the cities they play for.

In college, player and coaching preparation isn’t as important as it is in the NFL largely because there isn’t as much time for it. Offenses and defenses are simplified out of necessity, with shorter practice times and less developed players not permitting anything more complicated. While coaching preparation is always important, motivating and developing players are bigger components of the recipe for success at the college level. Often times teams will simply out-talent other teams in order to win.

The three attributes of Weis’ offensive strategy, design, and playcalling discussed above are extremely valuable in the NFL. With large amounts of time spent in practice, studying film, and adapting the offensive game plan from week-to-week, having a thoroughly diverse offense gives teams a distinct advantage. It allows offenses to shift identities, so to speak, without adding or subtracting plays. It also allows offenses to attack defenses in a variety of ways. With the complexities of NFL defenses, matching flexibility on the offensive side of the ball certainly has its advantages.

In short, the NFL game is much more about the “chess match” being played by the coaching staff on the sidelines and players on the field than it is about talent, development of talent, and player motivation. It is of primary importance to create schematic advantages to give a team the opportunity to win.

Conclusion

Obviously there are many aspects of Weis’ offense that are very valuable. However, many of those aspects seemingly don’t translate from the NFL to the college level. Weis’ ability to prepare is certainly of value in the NFL but less so with the players’ time restrictions in college. His ability to set up and call plays at the perfect time, and the capability and flexibility of his offense to create mismatches in the passing game and attack defenses differently each week are all of value. But most of these attributes of his offense aren’t as valuable in college as they were in the NFL.

Motivating and developing offensive players is far more important, especially if they are expected to run a precise offense. Execution isn’t a foregone conclusion with a complicated, pass-heavy playbook. Weis' first two years at Notre Dame the offense was productive but it was with a more developed and experienced team. Additionally, it isn’t always necessary to generate a schematic advantage to get the upper hand. Sometimes working more diligently to improve a player from a talented athlete into a disciplined, fundamentally sound football player is more important. It is also more advantageous at the college level to utilize talent disparities to win.

The lack of a significant running game also severely limits the effectiveness of Weis’ offense at the college level. Running the ball is the most effective way to win games at any level. Fewer things can go wrong on a running play than a passing play. Running plays require less precision and are easier to practice, master, execute, and perfect. Running the ball controls the clock, wears down defenses, takes pressure off the quarterback, and opens up the play-action passing game. In the NFL it is difficult to generate mismatches in the running game due to the talent and athleticism of the defenses. Teams use the passing game because it opens more opportunities for success. In college this isn’t necessary.

If it takes experienced, developed, polished players for Weis’ offense to be effective then he may be in trouble. Many college players will not develop until very late in their careers, especially at certain positions. Injuries, transfers, recruiting woes, and other attrition factors make it difficult to consistently field a team that is, as a whole, very polished and experienced. Couple that with the need for a very high level of quarterback play predicated upon consistency and repetition, and it is difficult to believe Weis will be able to field a powerful offense year in and year out.

The crux of the problem Weis faces is player development. If he and his staff can consistently develop the talent he recruits he can be successful with his brand of offense. If he can achieve a high level of quarterback play without requiring his first string quarterback to take ninety percent of practice snaps-preventing any development of a backup-he can field a productive offense. But he would be better served cutting out the fringes and focusing on motivating and development. He would also be better served listening to offensive coordinator Mike Haywood about the importance of an effective rushing attack. These things will be the determining factors to the future success of the Fighting Irish offense.